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Making an Even Number Odd: Deadlock-Avoiding in a Reunified Cyprus 
Supreme Court 
 
Tim Potier 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Substantive talks to re-unify the island of Cyprus re-commenced in September 2008. 
Sadly, the gulf between the two communities remains wide. The rejected „Annan 
Plan‟ proposed a (federal) Supreme Court that would have included three non-
Cypriot (deadlock-breaking) judges. This should not be preferred. However, to dispel 
any fears concerning the likely consequences of their absence, it is the purpose of this 
article to outline how any reunified Cyprus Supreme Court can rely on absolute 
political equality (alone), whilst still remaining functional and free from potential 
deadlock. The various procedures devised confirm that an even number can be made 
into an odd. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
THE reunification of Cyprus still eludes. The most recently completed process
1
 culminated in 
a referendum, on 24 April 2004, in which the Turkish Cypriots voted (convincingly) in favour 
of the so-called „Annan Plan‟, while the Greek Cypriots voted (even more convincingly) 
against
2
. In the end, if the island is ever to be reunified, both sides will have to make 
significant compromises. Yet, as this author has recently demonstrated in a recently published 
book covering many of the most highly disputed matters, variation from the rejected Plan 
often need not affect / disadvantage either side
3
. 
Cyprus – like Sri Lanka, Georgia and Moldova (to cite a few other similarly troubled 
societies) – is a country where any constitutional settlement would be only the start of what 
would be a long and difficult road to reconciliation. Success cannot and „should not‟ be 
guaranteed; occasionally states do fail; the responsibility to avoid this happening must lie with 
the local population. One avoidable reflection of this, in the rejected Plan, was the inclusion 
of foreign (non-Cypriot) judges on the Supreme Court. Its progeny is clear and understood: 
the ad hoc tribunal system in international law. Still, attempts to „internationalise‟ local 
problems should be avoided. In respect of the Supreme Court of the United Cyprus Republic, 
this was not done. 
 
II. ANNAN PLAN (FINAL VERSION): PROVISIONS 
 
                                                 
1
 Commenced (under UN auspices) on 14 January 2002. 
2
 The Turkish Cypriots voted 64.91% „yes‟, 35.09% „no‟; the Greek Cypriots, 75.83% „no‟, 24.17% 
„yes‟.  
3
 Tim Potier, A Functional Cyprus Settlement: the Constitutional Dimension (Verlag Franz Philipp 
Rutzen, Mainz und Ruhpolding, 2007). 
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The Supreme Court shall uphold the Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic (“the 
supreme law of the land”4) and ensure its full respect5 by other federal organs and the 
constituent states
6
. 
The Supreme Court shall be composed of 15 judges
7
. Six judges shall hail from each 
constituent state, plus three judges who are not citizens of the United Cyprus Republic
8
. The 
judges from the constituent states shall be citizens of the United Cyprus Republic
9
. The three 
judges who are not to be citizens of the United Cyprus Republic shall not be subjects or 
citizens of “the Hellenic Republic or the Republic of Turkey or of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland”10. Despite the inclusion of the non-Cypriot judges, 
political equality, guaranteeing effective participation for both communities, being a central 
requirement in any settlement on the island, is maintained
11
. 
The Court shall have its own Registry
12
. There shall be a Registrar, who shall not be a 
citizen of the United Cyprus Republic, and two Deputy Registrars who shall not hail from the 
same constituent state
13
. 
The Supreme Court shall assume its functions upon entry into force of the Foundation 
Agreement
14
, and evolve in its operation during a transitional period
15
. It shall come to sit 
                                                 
4
 Article 3(1) of the Constitution (Annex I, at Part II) provides: “(1) This Constitution, having been 
democratically adopted by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots through their separately 
expressed common will, is the supreme law of the land and is binding on all federal authorities and the 
constituent states. Any act by the federal government or either constituent state in contravention of this 
Constitution shall be null and void”. See also: Main Articles, Article 2(3) (third and final sentence).  
“… [T]hrough their separately expressed common will…”: that is, via the “separate simultaneous 
referenda” (see: Annex IX, Article 1(1)). 
5
 Main Articles, Article 6(1). 
6
 Annex I, Part II, Article 3(3). 
7
 “The judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from amongst lawyers of high professional and 
moral standing” (Federal Law on Administration of Justice (Annex III, Attachment 26, Law 1), Part II, 
Section 3(4)). They “… shall not hold any other public office in the Federal Government or in either 
constituent state” (Ibid, Section 3(5)). 
8
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice (Annex III, Attachment 26, Law 1), Part II, Section 3(1). 
Article 6(2) of the Main Articles states: “(2) It shall comprise an equal number of judges from each 
constituent state, and three non-Cypriot judges until otherwise provided by law”. The first sentence of 
Article 36(1) of the UCR Constitution (at Part V) provides: “(1) The Supreme Court of Cyprus shall 
count an equal number of judges from each constituent state among its members…” Concerning the 
phrase “… until otherwise provided by law”, in Article 6(2) (of the Main Articles), Section 3(8) of the 
Administration of Justice Law provides: “(8) In terms of Section 2 of Article 6 of the Foundation 
Agreement, the composition of the Court, as provided in subsection (1) above, may be altered by a 
Federal Law”. 
9
 Ibid, Section 3(2). 
10
 Ibid, Section 3(3). 
11
 Enunciated, most directly, in paragraph (iii) of the Preamble to the Main Articles: “Acknowledging 
each other‟s distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority 
but of political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other”. See also: 
Main Articles, Article 2(1)(a); Annex I, Part I, Article 1(4).  
12
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice (Annex III, Attachment 26, Law 1), Part IV, Section 24(1). 
13
 Ibid, Section 24(2). “(3) The Registrar and Deputy Registrars shall be persons of good moral 
character and conduct and shall have such legal qualifications and experience of practice as the Court 
may consider appropriate for their offices” (Section 24(3)). 
14
 Main Articles, Article 7(4). 
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(either) as a Constitutional Court or as a Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
16
. However, 
only those who shall serve as members of the Constitutional Court shall assume their 
functions immediately upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement
17
. That is, the three 
non-Cypriot judges and three judges hailing from each constituent state
18
. The remaining six 
judges shall serve on the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
19
 and, under the rejected Plan, 
were to have been “… appointed by the Presidential Council in the course of the month of 
July 2004...”20 Until then, the „other‟ (Constitutional Court) judges of the Supreme Court 
were to have exercised the functions attributed to the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
21
. 
The nine initial judges and the registrars of the Supreme Court are to be those Cypriots and 
non-Cypriots informed by the Secretary-General (of the United Nations) prior to the entry 
into force of the Foundation Agreement of their prospective appointment
22
. 
The Court may divide itself into Chambers. Should it so decide
23
, there shall be a “grand 
chamber of the Court” comprising all 15 members of the Court24. The Chambers of the 
Constitutional Court shall be: the Grand Constitutional Chamber (comprising all members of 
the Constitutional Court) and the first, second and third constitutional chambers. Each of 
these (latter) three Chambers shall comprise three judges, one from each constituent state, and 
one judge who is not a citizen of the United Cyprus Republic
25
. The Chambers of the Court of 
Primary Federal Jurisdiction shall be: the Grand Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction 
(comprising all members of the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction) and the first, second 
                                                                                                                                            
15
 See: Main Articles, Article 7(1). 
16
 First sentence of Article 36(7) of the UCR Constitution (at Part V). 
17
 Annex I, Part VII, Article 45(2). 
18
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Part II, Section 3(6). The three Registrars were, also, to 
have assumed their functions “… immediately upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement…” 
(Annex I, Part VII, Article 45(3)) 
19
 Administration of Justice Law, Section 3(7) (first sentence). 
20
 See: Annex I, Part VII, Article 45(4); and Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Part II, Section 
3(7). 
21
 Annex I, Part VII, Article 45(4) (second and final sentence). Article 36(7) of the Constitution (at Part 
V) provides: “(7) The Supreme Court of Cyprus shall sit as a Constitutional Court or as a Court of 
Primary Federal Jurisdiction. Judges shall be appointed to serve either on the Constitutional Court or 
the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction. The law shall regulate the number of judges serving in each 
court, the attribution of competence to each court, the division of the two courts into chambers, and any 
right of appeal within either court or from the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction to the 
Constitutional Court”. 
22
 Further to the eighth and final measure contained in Appendix F (“Measures to be taken during April 
2004”), “… the parties…” (that is, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the leader of the 
Turkish Cypriot community) shall (“… agree on and take the following measures, in close cooperation 
with the Secretary-General or his representative, and shall accept any indispensable suggestions of the 
Secretary-General or his representative where foreseen in this list”): “Provide to the Secretary-General 
no later than two days after successful referenda the names of the… Cypriot members of the Supreme 
Court, and otherwise accept any indispensable suggestions of the Secretary-General or his 
representative”. The Foundation Agreement could not have entered into force during this period (“… 
no later than two days after successful referenda…”). 
23
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Part III, Section 20(1). 
24
 Ibid, Section 20(2). 
25
 Ibid, Section 20(3). 
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and third primary chambers (each comprising two judges, one hailing from each constituent 
state). The President of the Court may, “at his discretion”, assign one of the non-Cypriot 
judges to sit in a particular case of the Grand Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
26
.  
The Supreme Court shall strive to reach its decisions by consensus and issue joint 
judgments of the Court
27
. In the event that a consensus cannot be reached, the Cypriot judges 
may, by a majority, take the decision of the Court
28
. Further to Section 23(3) of the federal 
law: 
“(3) In the event of there being no decision by consensus and no majority among the 
Cypriot Judges, those Judges who are not citizens of the United Cyprus Republic, acting 
together and speaking with one voice, shall participate in the decision of the Court”29. 
 
III. NON-CYPRIOT JUDGES 
 
For any society to succeed, it must have (/ at least feel that it has) ownership of its 
Constitution and system; the absence of this leads to disharmony, disagreement and, 
invariably, conflict. Perhaps, although it is painful for some to admit it, the path to and 
outcome of the establishment of the 1960 Republic is an all-too obvious testament to this 
fact
30
.  
A society‟s ownership of its Constitution and system does not guarantee success. It may be 
that the society itself is so divided, beyond the mere confines of its law, that nothing can make 
it function. However, at least with „ownership‟ (even though this may never truly operate in a 
vacuum) comes responsibility, including for any failure. It is this that the international 
community should allow, when / where it occurs, and compel those responsible to (first) find 
a solution. This is one area where the „Annan Plan‟ fails. Fearing (ultimate) deadlock in the 
Supreme Court (for example), the non-Cypriot judges are installed and, as and when 
necessary, would be called upon to intervene. This cannot be a solution, for not only would 
their condition negate that responsibility, but their appointment and every occasion they 
would be required to decide would be reduced to / become a cause of / for rumour, 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, Section 20(4). 
27
 Ibid, Section 23(1); and, Annex I, Part V, Article 36(8) (first sentence). 
28
 Ibid, Section 23(2). 
29
 Reflecting the need to reach a „majority‟, as prescribed in Section 23(2) and (3), the second sentence 
of Article 36(8) of the UCR Constitution provides: “(8)… However, all decision of the Supreme Court 
may be taken by simple majority as specified by law”. The non-Cypriot judges, “acting together and 
speaking with one voice”, in effect, realising that majority in an otherwise (among the Cypriot judges) 
deadlocked Court. 
30
 For example, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities did not attend the Zürich 
Conference (6-11 February 1959; prior to the London Conference, 11-16 February 1959), where 
agreement was reached on a future Cyprus Republic between the governments of Greece and Turkey; 
nor were the Cypriot people consulted prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 
August 1960. 
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speculation, mistrust, division and failure. What an unedifying spectacle for one of the most 
honoured professions. 
The non-Cypriot component on the Supreme Court should be removed. The Court should 
be composed (only) of an equal number of persons hailing from each constituent state. Such 
does, of course, raise fears about the consequences of deadlock should consensus fail and the 
judges from each constituent state split 50:50. It is the purpose of this article to explain how 
this can be avoided. 
 
IV. „AN AMENDED COURT‟ 
 
Rather than 15 judges (including 3 non-Cypriot judges), the Supreme Court should be 
composed of 24 judges, 12 hailing from each constituent state. The entire Court should be in 
place upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. There should be no transitional 
Court
31
.  
It shall continue to sit, either, as a Constitutional Court or as a Court of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction. An equal number of Cypriot judges (with the non-Cypriot judges now absent) 
would, also, continue to serve on the two courts
32
, except that the numbers should be doubled 
from 6 (each) to 12. Judges would (still) be appointed to serve either on the Constitutional 
Court or the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
33
.  
The Court should be divided into Chambers
34
. The Grand Constitutional Chamber 
(comprising all members of the Constitutional Court) and the Grand Chamber of Primary 
Federal Jurisdiction (comprising all members of the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction) 
would remain. However, rather than three additional chambers each, the Constitutional Court 
                                                 
31
 This is reflected in Article 45 of the UCR Constitution (at Part VII): “(1) Upon entry into force of the 
Foundation Agreement, the judges… of the Supreme Court shall be those Cypriots and non-Cypriots 
informed by the Secretary-General prior to the entry into force of the Foundation Agreement of their 
prospective appointment pursuant to the Comprehensive Settlement. (2) The judges of the Supreme 
Court, who shall serve as members of the Constitutional Court, shall assume their functions 
immediately upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement and shall remain in office for 36 
calendar months, unless the federal Parliament decides with special majority to extend their terms… (4) 
The judges who shall serve on the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction shall be appointed by the 
Presidential Council in the course of the month of July 2004. Until then, the other judges of the 
Supreme Court shall exercise the functions attributed to the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction”. 
32
 That is, the Constitutional Court and Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction. 
33
 The second sentence of Article 36(7) of the UCR Constitution provides (at Part V): “… Judges shall 
be appointed to serve either on the Constitutional Court or the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction…” 
See also: Section 3(6) and (7) of the Federal Law on Administration of Justice (at Part II).  
34
 Section 20(1) of the Federal Law on Administration of Justice (at Part III) states: “(1) The Court may 
divide itself into Chambers in accordance with Section 7 of Article 36 of the Constitution and, should it 
so decide, it shall, subject to the power of the Court otherwise to organise its work, sit in the Chambers 
indicated in subsection (2), each of which Chambers shall deal with such matters and cases as the Court 
may by Rules or Practice Directions direct”. The federal law does not indicate by what means „it 
should so decide‟. “… [S]it in the Chambers indicated in subsection (2)…” is incorrect. “[S]ubsection 
(2)” merely confirms the existence of a “… grand chamber of the Court…” The Chambers of the 
Supreme Court are “indicated” in subsections (2), (3) and (4). The relevant part of “Section 7 of Article 
36” merely provides: “(7)… The law shall regulate… the division of the two courts into chambers…” 
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and Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction should be further served by two. The first and 
second constitutional chambers and the first and second primary chambers would each 
comprise six judges (three hailing from each constituent state). The “original members” of the 
Court should be separated into their (respective) Chamber by lot. Any (subsequent /) newly 
appointed judge, following the death, retirement, dismissal or permanent incapacity of an 
existing judge would serve in the Chamber of the judge who has been replaced
35
. However, in 
the spirit of the partial periodic renewal of the Court, every three years, the membership in the 
Chambers would be re-cast, again by lot (and affect all new cases during any forthcoming 
three-year „term‟)36. Such would avoid any Chamber / appointment becoming politicised. 
The jurisdiction exerciseable by the Court
37
 is provisionally assigned (/ distributed) 
between the Chambers under Annex I of the Federal Law
38
. The jurisdiction of the Grand 
Constitutional Chamber
39
 and the Grand Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction
40
 would 
                                                 
35
 Such newly-appointed judge should, also, take the place of any judge who had been sitting in any 
ongoing case (/ prior to any suspension, whilst any misconduct is being considered by the Judiciary 
Board). The „filling of a vacancy‟ during consideration of a case is addressed, only, in Annex III (titled: 
“The Default Provision and Deadlock-Resolution Procedural Rules”), Rule 21 of the Federal Law. It 
states: “(1) In the event of the death of any of the Judges or of their being prevented by ill-health or 
otherwise from taking part in the proceedings, the Presidential Council or Transitional Federal 
Government, as the case may be, shall fill any vacancy so caused by an appointment made in 
accordance with Law and in the case of a temporary absence or incapacity the arrangements provided 
in section 17 [actually Section 12] of the Law shall apply. (2) The proceedings shall continue 
notwithstanding that such a vacancy as aforesaid shall not be filled, and, if it shall be filled, the 
proceedings prior to such vacancy shall not be reopened or recapitulated”. 
36
 See: Part II, Section 8(3). 
37
 “[L]isted as Chapters of the Schedule”: opening part of Annex I (titled: “The Provisional Assignment 
of Jurisdiction to Chambers Rules”) of the Federal Law. 
38
 Section 20(1) and (6) (at Part III) state: “(1) The Court may divide itself into Chambers in 
accordance with Section 7 of Article 36 of the Constitution and, should it so decide, it shall, subject to 
the power of the Court otherwise to organise its work, sit in the Chambers indicated in subsection (2) 
[incorrect reference], each of which Chambers shall deal with such matters and cases as the Court may 
by Rules or Practice Directions direct… (6) Pending the making of Rules under paragraphs (1) and (3) 
[reference only to paragraph (1) should be made here] above, the jurisdictions listed in the Chapters set 
out in Schedule shall be allocated to Chambers subject to the approval of the Court. Such allocations in 
the “Provisional Allocation of Jurisdictions to Chambers Rules” shall be deemed to have been made 
under the preceding paragraphs of this section and may at any time be varied, repealed or substituted 
by Rules or Practice Directions made thereunder”. 
39
 Described in Annex I (of the federal law) as: “Chapter 1. Disputes between the constituent states or 
between any of them and the Federal Government. 2. Exclusive jurisdiction regarding validity of Laws 
and precedents of Constitutional Laws. 3. Appeals regarding interpretation or an alleged violation of 
the Foundation Agreement, the Constitution, a Constitutional Law, or a treaty binding the United 
Cyprus Republic. 5. Jurisdiction to take an ad interim decision in respect of a deadlock arising in any of 
the institutions of the Federal Government. 7. Review of decisions of the Aliens Appeals Court in 
citizenship matters. 8. Review of decisions of the Aliens Appeals Court in aliens matters. 9. Carryover 
of the previous Federal budget. 10. Disputes resulting from application of the Agreement on European 
Union Affairs. 11. Territorial Arrangements – demarcation of boundaries and access roads. 15. 
Impeachment and immunities. 21. References to the Court of Justice of the European Community as 
regards all questions falling within the scope of the chapters enumerated above”. Chapter 3 is 
incorrectly described here (in fact everywhere), under the Third Constitutional Chamber (see footnote 
45), as well as in the Schedule and Article 36(4) of the UCR Constitution. The title of Chapter 3, in the 
Schedule, is: “Appeals regarding interpretation of or an alleged violation of the Foundation Agreement, 
the Constitution, Federal Laws (including federal administrative decisions) and Treaties binding upon 
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remain unaltered. The jurisdiction of the (two) „first and second‟ primary chambers would 
remain unaltered, as the jurisdiction of the three primary chambers, in the current law, is 
identical
41
. The same, however, is not the case with the three (current) constitutional 
chambers. To effect three into two, the jurisdiction resting with the third constitutional 
chamber would be separated between the first
42
 and second
43
 constitutional chamber. Chapter 
21 rests (identically) with both the first and second constitutional chamber „already‟; Chapters 
16 and 20
44
 would be transferred to the first constitutional chamber; and, the stated 
                                                                                                                                            
the United Cyprus Republic”. Paragraph (1) of Chapter 3 states: “The Court shall be the appeals court 
in all disputes on matters which involve the interpretation or any alleged violation of the Foundation 
Agreement, the Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic, Federal Laws, (including federal 
administrative decisions) and treaties binding upon the United Cyprus Republic, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its applicable Protocols”. Article 36(4) of the UCR 
Constitution (at Part V) provides: “(4) The Supreme Court shall be the appeals court in all other 
disputes on matters which involve the interpretation or an alleged violation of the Foundation 
Agreement, this Constitution, federal laws (including federal administrative decisions), or treaties 
binding upon the United Cyprus Republic”. An Observation to Article 36(4) adds: “Observation: this 
includes the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Additional Protocols in force for Cyprus”. Chapter 3, as described under the Grand 
Constitutional Chamber, is correct to include “[a]ppeals regarding… a Constitutional Law…” – the 
necessary inclusion of “a Constitutional Law” is incorrectly missing elsewhere. However, under the 
Grand Constitutional Chamber, Chapter 3 is „still‟ incorrectly described as it fails, in light of paragraph 
(1) of Chapter 3, to include (after “a Constitutional Law”) “Federal Laws[,] (including federal 
administrative decisions)”. 
40
 Described in Annex I as: “Chapter 19. Admiralty jurisdiction – International Navigation, Territorial 
Waters and Continental Shelf. Appeals from a lower Chambers [sic.]. 21. References to the Court of 
Justice of the European Community when sitting as an appellate or review tribunal. [new paragraph] 
This Chamber has jurisdiction to hear appeals from any decision of a Chamber exercising primary 
criminal jurisdiction. [new paragraph] This Chamber has jurisdiction to hear appeals on interlocutory 
matters decided by two or three judges”. 
41
 Described (respectively) in Annex I as: “4. Primary jurisdiction over violations of Federal Laws 
where provided by Federal legislation. 19. Admiralty jurisdiction – International Navigation, Territorial 
Waters and Continental Shelf. 22. Jurisdiction to issue orders. [new paragraph] Directions, 
interlocutory proceedings and orders”. 
42
 The jurisdiction assigned to the First Constitutional Chamber under the current law is described in 
Annex I as: “Chapter 2. Exclusive jurisdiction regarding validity of Laws and precedents of 
Constitutional Laws. 3. Appeals regarding interpretation or an alleged violation of the Foundation 
Agreement, the Constitution, a Constitutional Law, or a treaty binding the United Cyprus Republic. 17. 
Treaties concluded prior to entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. 21. References to the Court 
of Justice of the European Community as regards all questions falling within the scope of the chapters 
enumerated above”. 
43
 The jurisdiction assigned to the Second Constitutional Chamber under the current law is described in 
Annex I as: “Chapter 6. Power to issue injunctions on entry to or residence in a constituent state. 7. 
Review of decision[s] of the Aliens Appeals Court in citizenship matters. 8. Review of decisions of the 
Aliens Appeals Court in aliens matters. 12. Establishment of the Property Court. 13. Removal of 
members of the Property Board. 15. [should read 14.] Period of operation of the Property Board. 19. 
[should read 18.] State-owned property. 21. References to the Court of Justice of the European 
Community as regards all questions falling within the scope of the chapters enumerated above”. 
44
 Described in Annex I as: “[Chapter] 16. Electoral Court. 20. Jurisdiction conferred by Constitutional 
Law, Co-operation Agreements and Federal Laws”. 
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competence of the third constitutional chamber in respect of Chapter 3
45
 would be transferred 
to the second constitutional chamber. 
Each chamber of the Supreme Court should be divided into sections and groups.  
The two constitutional chambers and two primary chambers should each be divided into 
two sections (A and B). Any such section would comprise three judges (two hailing from one 
constituent state, one the other). Similarly, the Grand Constitutional Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction should each be divided into two sections (A and B). 
Any such section would comprise six judges (four hailing from one constituent state, two the 
other). The “original members” of the Court should be, further, separated into their 
(respective) sections (two for each) by lot. Any (subsequent /) newly appointed judge, 
following the death, retirement, dismissal or permanent incapacity of an existing judge would 
serve in the sections of the judge who has been replaced. The re-casting of chambers, every 
three years, would affect the membership of all sections, to be drawn by lot, also (again, 
affecting all new cases during the forthcoming three-year term). 
Judges should, also, be divided into groups of two. Such pairs (including the two the 
President of the Supreme Court would be a member of) should be determined on the basis of, 
first (and taking precedence), the total time served on the Court and, second, to guarantee 
separation, by age
46
. Each pair should consist of one judge hailing from each constituent state. 
Consequently, determination of the „judge‟ for each group should be effected by constituent 
state. The two constitutional chambers and two primary chambers should each consist of three 
groups (A to C). The Grand Constitutional Chamber and the Grand Chamber of Primary 
Federal Jurisdiction should each consist of six groups (A to F). The „most senior‟ group (for 
that Chamber) should be „Pair A‟, the „least senior‟ either „Pair C‟ or „Pair F‟ (depending). In 
most cases, a judge would have a different pair for each of the two groups to which he/she 
was a member. The re-casting of chambers would, for any new period, quite likely affect the 
(relevant) group a judge was a member of. 
There should continue to be a grand chamber of the Court comprising (now) all (24) 
members of the Court
47
. The grand chamber of the Court, the plenary formation and 
manifestation of the Supreme Court, would not hear cases, but make Rules of Court for 
                                                 
45
 Described (for the Third Constitutional Chamber, compare with its description for the Grand 
Constitutional Chamber) in Annex I as: “[Chapter] 3. Appeals regarding interpretation of an alleged 
violation of a Federal Law (including Federal administrative decisions)”. 
46
 This is broadly consonant with Section 6(1) of the federal law (at Part II): “(1) The President of the 
Supreme Court shall be considered the most senior judge of the Court. Among the other judges, 
seniority shall be determined firstly by time served in office and by age in case of equal time served. 
[new paragraph] Provided that the seniority of the first judges of the Court shall be determined by 
reference to their age, subject to seniority being accorded to the President of the Court in terms of this 
subsection”. 
47
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Part III, Section 20(2). 
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regulating its practice and procedure
48
. The quorum for making such Rules should be 18 
(judges), a decision for any such Rule requiring separate majorities from the participating 
judges hailing from each constituent state. The latter condition, quorum having been satisfied, 
would avoid the possibility of any outcome depending, alone, on „those‟ that were in 
attendance. 
The current federal law provides for the election of a President of the Supreme Court. The 
President
49
 shall be elected by the judges of the Court (“from among their number”) for a 
renewable period of three years
50
. Although this is not provided in the federal law, such 
election should be the first act of the Court after the entry into force of the Foundation 
Agreement. However, the President should be further assisted by a First Deputy President and 
two Deputy Presidents, also elected (the next acts; if not done, also, at the same meeting) by 
the judges of the Court. Within the „Presidency‟ of the Court, two judges should hail from 
each constituent state: the President should not hail from the same constituent state as the 
First Deputy President, the President should only be allowed to serve a maximum two (three 
year) terms (that is, six years; therefore, renewable only once) and successive Presidents (by 
person, not term) should not hail from the same constituent state. The President and First 
Deputy President should be judges who will or do serve on the Constitutional Court; the two 
Deputy Presidents should be judges who will or do serve on the Court of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction. The election of the „Presidency of the Court‟ should be undertaken by the “grand 
Chamber of the Court”. During any “temporary absence or incapacity” of the President, the 
Deputy President hailing from the same constituent state as the President shall be Acting 
President
51
. 
 
V. „COMPROMISE PROCEDURE‟ 
 
Potential failure in the Court is „averted‟ by the intervention of the non-Cypriot judges52, 
following failure to secure (even) a majority. Some aspects of the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall (as seen and explained below) require a „singular‟ determination / view / opinion 
                                                 
48
 Section 34(1) of the federal law (at Part V) provides: “(1) The Court shall decide on the organisation 
of its work and make Rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of the Court in the 
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution and by this Law”. 
49
 To repeat: “(1) The President of the Supreme Court shall be considered the most senior judge of the 
Court…” (Ibid, Part II, Section 6(1), first sentence) 
50
 Ibid, Section 5. 
51
 The federal law currently provides that in the case of the President‟s “temporary absence or 
incapacity”, “… the other judges shall elect an Acting President to act in his place…” (Ibid, Section 
12(1)(b)) 
52
 No answer, however, is given (in the federal law) to the question what happens if the President of the 
Court (“at his discretion”) has not assigned one of the non-Cypriot judges to sit in a case of the Grand 
Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction and the chamber has divided 50:50. Further, it would appear 
that the three primary chambers may not have a non-Cypriot judge assigned to any given case. Yet, 
what if the two judges (in the relevant chamber) are divided? Again, no answer is given. 
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(positive or negative). However, other aspects (of the Court‟s jurisdiction) may be amenable 
to individual / considered fashioning or design, whether in the macro or micro. In this regard, 
therefore, the decided judgment may be(/come) the product of some form of compromise, 
although compromise (here) need not have one meaning / face only. Such procedure shall 
apply to four Chapters and part of two others. 
The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction (Chapter 1) over disputes between the 
constituent states, between one or both constituent states and the federal government and 
between organs of the federal Government
53
. Such recourse may be made by any of the 
Presidents of the federal Government and of the constituent states (and, during the transitional 
period, also by the Co-Presidents of the federal Government
54
); either chamber of the federal 
Parliament; either or both of the constituent states‟ legislatures; or any other organ or 
authority of the federal Government and of the constituent states, if involved in such 
dispute
55
. 
The Court shall be the appeals court (Chapter 3, part) in all disputes on matters which 
involve the interpretation of the Foundation Agreement, the Constitution of the United Cyprus 
Republic, federal laws (including federal administrative decisions) and treaties binding upon 
the United Cyprus Republic, including the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Additional Protocols in force for Cyprus
56
. 
The Court shall („also‟) have exclusive jurisdiction (Chapter 5) to take an ad interim 
decision, should there arise a deadlock in one of the institutions of the federal Government 
preventing the taking of a decision without which the federal government or its institutions 
could not properly function, or the absence of which would result in a substantial default on 
the obligations of the United Cyprus Republic as a member of the European Union. A 
member of the Presidential Council, the President or (a) Vice-President of either Chamber of 
Parliament, or the Attorney-General or Deputy Attorney-General may apply to the Court to 
make such ad interim decision (the Court “always exercising appropriate restraint”)57. Any 
                                                 
53
 Annex I (UCR Constitution), Part V, Article 36(2); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, 
Schedule, Chapter 1, paragraph (1). 
54
 The executive organ, under the Annan Plan, is the Presidential Council. However, during a brief 
transitional period, until the (first elected) federal Parliament has elected the Presidential Council, “the 
office of the Head of State shall be vested in the Co-Presidency” (Annex I, Part VII, Article 40(1)). 
Further to Article 40(2) of the UCR Constitution: “(2) The Co-Presidents shall be the persons whose 
names are communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than two days after 
successful referenda or, in the absence of such communication, the head of government of the relevant 
constituent state”. 
55
 Chapter 1 (of the Schedule), paragraph (2). 
56
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(4) (including Note (22)); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, 
Schedule, Chapter 3, paragraph (1). 
57
 Chapter 5, paragraph 1. 
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decision of the Court shall remain in force until such time as a decision on the matter is taken 
by the institution in question
58
. 
The financial year shall begin on 1 January and end on 31 December of each year
59
. If the 
federal Parliament is unable to approve a Budget before the beginning of the fiscal year, the 
Budget of the previous year, adjusted by inflation minus 1%, shall be carried on to the next 
fiscal year, unless the Supreme Court of Cyprus, “in the exercise of its deadlock-resolving 
power”, decides otherwise60. The Supreme Court, under Chapter 9 (and, also, Article 36(6) of 
the UCR Constitution), is empowered to make “ad interim provision” other than the carryover 
stipulated
61
. 
The Court shall, in defined circumstances, have the power to decide on the precise 
demarcation on the ground of the boundaries of the constituent states (Chapter 11, paragraph 
(1)). The boundaries of the constituent states are depicted in maps attached to the 
Constitution
62
. These are described in detail in Attachment 1 of Annex VI (Annex VI is titled: 
“Territorial Arrangements”)63. Any inconsistency between the maps and the geographical 
coordinates listed in the tables contained in Attachment 1 (of Annex VI) shall be decided by 
the Boundary Committee
64
. However, where the Committee is unable to reach consensus, the 
inconsistency shall be settled by the Supreme Court
65
. 
Public property, other than federal property or municipal property, is the property of the 
constituent state in which it is located
66
. The Co-Presidents and the heads of government of 
the constituent states shall agree (Chapter 18) on the list of federal property no later than three 
months after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. Should they fail to agree, the 
Supreme Court shall decide on this list based on representations by all interested parties
67
. 
                                                 
58
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(6); and Chapter 5, paragraph 2. 
59
 Federal Law on the Budget (Annex III, Attachment 8), Part IX, Section 45. 
60
 Ibid, Part I, Section 8, first paragraph. 
61
 Again, as per Article 36(6) (of the UCR Constitution, second sentence), “… [i]n so acting, the 
Supreme Court shall exercise appropriate restraint”. According to the second paragraph of Section 8 of 
the Federal Law on the Budget, if, at any time, the federal Parliament approves the Budget for the fiscal 
year in question – whether the Supreme Court has made any ad interim provision or not – “… such 
approved Budget shall be deemed to be in force as from the 1 of January of that year, but without 
prejudice to anything previously done by virtue of this section…” 
62
 Annex I, Attachment 1. 
63
 Attachment 1 of Annex VI is titled: “Detailed Description of the Course of the Boundary Between 
the Constituent States”. 
64
 Further to Article 1(2) of Annex VI: “(2) There shall be a Boundary Committee comprising three 
representatives of each constituent state and at least one non-Cypriot. The Committee shall be 
appointed upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, and shall demarcate the boundary on the 
ground”. 
65
 Annex VI, Article 1(3) (final sentence). 
66
 Annex I, Part VII, Article 51(1). 
67
 Article 51(2) of the UCR Constitution concludes: “(2)… Such properties shall be considered as 
federal properties from the date of entry into force of the Foundation Agreement unless otherwise 
decided”. 
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A dispute between, interpretation of, decision, provision, demarcation and location need 
not result in the determination (only) of one of two possible outcomes. Rather, the outcome 
can be without such constraint. An outcome, though, whatever its form, shall remain 
necessary, but this will be „eased‟ by the opportunity to secure a compromise, which can be as 
„singular‟ or not as is conceived. 
The „Compromise Procedure‟ would operate as follows: 
Such type of case before the Grand Constitutional Chamber / Grand Chamber of Primary 
Federal Jurisdiction, first / second constitutional chamber, first / second primary chamber 
would be heard by all the judges of the relevant chamber. The case would also be heard by 
two judges from the other („partner‟) chamber of the Court. Thus, for example, if a case was 
being heard by the second constitutional chamber, the two judges would be members of the 
first constitutional chamber. These (two, one hailing from each constituent state) would be 
drawn by lot (see below). Alternatively, if a case was being heard by the Grand Constitutional 
Chamber, the two judges would be members of the Grand Chamber of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction. Immediately after the drawing of these two judges, and again by lot, a judge (/ 
further judge, for a case being heard by one of the Grand Chambers) may / may not be drawn 
(see below) from the other Court (here, from these examples, the Court of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction), the identity of the drawn / earlier drawn judge, though, remaining „sealed‟.  
The drawing of the two judges (from the „partner‟ chamber) would be governed by a 
different procedure to that of the judge from the other Court / further judge (for cases heard 
by one of the Grand Chambers). With the former, for any sequence, two judges would be 
drawn no more than twice (or five times, „in the case‟ of the Grand Chambers). With the 
latter, for any sequence, the judge / further judge would be drawn no more than six times. 
Again with the latter, for cases heard by one of the Grand Chambers, in the event that the 
drawn / earlier drawn judge is one of the two judges, a new judge will be drawn (being 
revealed) and again (also being revealed) if that judge is the other of the two judges. Where 
this occurs (but only when this occurs), any sequence may extend beyond six (separate) 
draws. Of course, each sequence for each chamber (other than for an appeal from a Chamber 
to the Grand Chamber under Chapter 3, see below) would be separate from the sequences of 
any other chamber. 
As provided for in the Foundation Agreement, the Court (here the six / twelve judges of 
the relevant chamber) would strive to reach its decision by consensus and issue a joint 
judgment. Likewise, failing such consensus, a decision may be taken by simple majority. It is 
„only‟ where the chamber were evenly divided (of course, minus the non-Cypriot judges) that 
the procedure would be radically different. 
Following the failure to reach a decision by simple majority, each of the (six / twelve) 
judges of the chamber would issue a separate judgment. The two judges from the „partner‟ 
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chamber (having heard the case also) would consider these judgments and attempt, between 
themselves, to arrive at a compromise judgment. This compromise judgment may (/ also) 
include / represent their own opinion on the case. In the event that the two, themselves, are 
unable to agree on a compromise judgment, they will each be required (separately) to select 
(from the most preferred to the least preferred) their preferred judgment from the (six / 
twelve) individual judgments issued by the judges of the „relevant chamber‟. At the exact 
same time, the six / twelve judges from the chamber shall each be required to select their most 
preferred judgment issued by one of the (three / six) judges hailing from the other constituent 
state (see below). The most preferred judgment (of each of the two judges from the „other‟ 
chamber) should be given a rank of „1‟, through to the least preferred a rank of „6‟ / „12‟. The 
(two) judges would exchange their selection and, together, add up the total „score‟. The 
judgment with the lowest score would be considered the given judgment for that case. 
Consider the following example: 
The judges of the „relevant chamber‟ hailing from the Greek Cypriot State have 
(respectively) issued judgments A, B and C (/ G, H and I, also); the judges hailing from the 
Turkish Cypriot State judgments D, E and F (/ J, K and L, also). 
The (two) judges ranked these judgments in the following order: 
Greek Cypriot State judge    Turkish Cypriot State judge 
(1) B (1) B      (1) E (1) E 
(2) A (2) A      (2) F (2) F 
(3) C (3) C      (3) D (3) D 
(4) F (4) H      (4) B (4) J 
(5) D (5) G      (5) A (5) L 
(6) E (6) I      (6) C (6) K 
  (7) F       (7) B 
  (8) D       (8) A 
  (9) E       (9) C 
  (10) L       (10) I 
  (11) J       (11) H 
  (12) K       (12) G 
 
The scores for each of the (six / twelve) judgments would be: (i) (six) (A) 7; (B) 5; (C) 9; 
(D) 8; (E) 7; (F) 6; and, (ii) (twelve) (A) 10; (B) 8; (C) 12; (D) 11; (E) 10; (F) 9; (G) 17; (H) 
15; (I) 16; (J) 15; (K) 18; (L) 15. 
The judgment with the lowest score, from these examples, would, in both instances, be 
judgment (B), which would be the given judgment for that case. 
Of course, two or more judgments may tie. 
Consider the following example: 
Greek Cypriot State judge    Turkish Cypriot State judge 
(1) B (1) B      (1) E (1) E 
(2) C (2) C      (2) F (2) F 
(3) A (3) G      (3) A (3) A 
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(4) F (4) H      (4) D (4) J 
(5) D (5) A      (5) B (5) L 
(6) E (6) I      (6) C (6) K 
(7) E       (7) D  
(8) D       (8) B 
(9) F       (9) C 
(10) L       (10) I 
(11) J       (11) H 
(12) K       (12) G 
The scores here would be: (i) (six) (A) 6; (B) 6; (C) 8; (D) 9; (E) 7; (F) 6; and, (ii) (twelve) 
(A) 8; (B) 9; (C) 11; (D) 15; (E) 8; (F) 11; (G) 15; (H) 15; (I) 16; (J) 15; (K) 18; (L) 15.   
In these examples, (six) three judgments (A, B and F) would tie with a score of „6‟ and 
(twelve) two judgments (A and E) would tie with a score of „8‟. 
In such an event, and from the above examples, the most preferred judgment (from among, 
only, the tied judgments) by a judge from the other constituent state should be examined in 
order to determine the given judgment. 
Here: (i) (six) (Judgment A) got a score of „3‟, (Judgment B) „5‟, and (Judgment F) „4‟; 
and, (ii) (twelve) (Judgment A) got a score of „3‟, and (Judgment E) got a score of „7‟. Out of 
this, in both instances (again), the given judgment for the case would be judgment (A). 
However, even by adding this (next) stage, the tie may still remain knotted. 
Consider this example: 
Greek Cypriot State judge    Turkish Cypriot State judge 
(1) B (1) B      (1) E (1) E 
(2) A (2) A      (2) F (2) F 
(3) C (3) C      (3) D (3) D 
(4) F (4) H      (4) A (4) J 
(5) D (5) G      (5) B (5) L 
(6) E (6) I      (6) C (6) K 
  (7) F       (7) A 
  (8) D       (8) B 
  (9) E       (9) C 
  (10) L       (10) I 
  (11) J       (11) H 
  (12) K       (12) G 
Here, three judgments, in both instances, (A, B and F) would tie with a score of „6‟ / „9‟, 
but application of „the most preferred judgment (from among, only, the tied judgments) by a 
judge from the other constituent state‟ would yield the following outcome: (Judgment A) with 
a score of „4‟ / „7‟; (Judgment B) „5‟ / „8‟; and (Judgment F) „4‟ / „7‟. 
Judgment (B), with a score of „5‟ / „8‟, would withdraw, but judgments (A) and (F) would 
remain tied. 
In these examples: (i) (six) judgments (C), (D) and (E) have (respectively) the following 
scores: 9, 8 and 7; and, (ii) (twelve) judgments (C), (D), (E), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K) and (L) 
have (again respectively) 12, 11, 10, 17, 15, 16, 15, 18 and 15. The next stage would be to 
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determine which of the tied judgments was preferred more by the justice (from the other 
chamber) hailing from the constituent state whose state did not issue the least preferred 
judgment. Here, the least preferred judgment is (six) (C) / (twelve) (K), issued by a judge 
hailing from the (six) Greek Cypriot State / (twelve) Turkish Cypriot State. Therefore, the tied 
judgment (A) or (F) preferred more by the other judge would be judgment (six) (F) / (twelve) 
(A) – (i) (six) (F), from that justice (Turkish Cypriot State), being ranked second, (A) fourth; 
and (ii) (twelve) (A), from that justice (Greek Cypriot State), being ranked second, (F) 
seventh. 
However, what happens if there is no least preferred judgment. 
Consider these two examples: 
Greek Cypriot State judge    Turkish Cypriot State judge 
(1) B (1) B      (1) E (1) E 
(2) A (2) A      (2) F (2) F 
(3) C (3) C      (3) D (3) D 
(4) F (4) H      (4) A (4) J 
(5) E (5) I      (5) B (5) L 
(6) D (6) G      (6) C (6) K 
  (7) F       (7) A 
  (8) E       (8) B 
  (9) D       (9) C 
  (10) L       (10) I 
  (11) J       (11) H 
  (12) K       (12) G 
The scores here would be: (i) (six) (A) 6; (B) 6; (C) 9; (D) 9; (E) 6; (F) 6; and (ii) (twelve) 
(A) 9; (B) 9; (C) 12; (D) 12; (E) 9; (F) 9; (G) 18; (H) 15; (I) 15; (J) 15; (K) 18; (L) 15. 
Now there is a „four-way‟ tie, in both instances, between judgments (A), (B), (E) and (F). 
To repeat the above-stated procedure: 
(i) „the most preferred judgment (from among, only, the tied judgments) by a judge from 
the other constituent state‟ would yield the following outcome: (Judgment A) with a score of 
„4‟ / „7‟; (Judgment B) „5‟ / „8‟; (Judgment E) „5‟ / „8‟; and (Judgment F) „4‟ / „7‟. 
In both examples, judgments (B) and (E) would withdraw, but judgments (A) and (F) 
would remain tied. 
(ii) „which of the tied judgments was preferred more by the justice (from the other 
chamber) hailing from the constituent state whose state did not issue the least preferred 
judgment‟? 
In these examples, there is no „least preferred judgment‟, as: (i) (six) judgments (C) and 
(D) have both „tied‟ with a score of „9‟; and (ii) (twelve) judgments (G) and (K) have both 
tied with a score of „18‟. 
What next? 
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(iii) which of the (still) tied judgments ((A) or (F)) was most preferred by the six / twelve 
judges from the chamber (each of these having selected their most preferred judgment issued 
by one of the – three / six – judges hailing from the other constituent state)? 
If (six) one / (twelve) two of the (Greek Cypriot State) judges ((six) A to C or (twelve) A 
to C and G to I) „most preferred‟ judgment (F), but (six) two / (twelve) four of the (Turkish 
Cypriot State) judges ((six) D to F or (twelve) D to F and J to L) „most preferred‟ judgment 
(A), then, in both instances, the given judgment for the case would be judgment (A). 
However, even this stage may yield a tie if the number were the same: whether (six) 0, 1, 2, or 
3 or (twelve) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. If such occurred, the court would proceed to the final, 
determining stage: 
(iv) the identity of the „drawn / earlier drawn‟ judge from the other Court (/ further judge, 
for a case being heard by one of the Grand Chambers) would be revealed. This judge would 
be provided with a copy of the transcript of the proceedings and the remaining tied 
judgments. Having read and considered all relevant (for this judge) documents, the judge shall 
be required to indicate the preferred (remaining tied) judgment; from the current example, of 
course, either judgment (A) or (F). This preferred judgment would be rendered the given 
judgment for the case. 
Via this procedure, a judgment for such cases could be arrived at, neither at the expense of 
the judges from one of the constituent states, nor having demanded the intervention of non-
Cypriot judges. The determination(/s) / view(/s) or opinion(/s) of the „two judges‟ and „judge 
from the other Court / further judge‟ may have not been required. Consensus may have been 
reached from the outset or a majority secured (/ a compromise judgment arrived at / preferred 
judgment identified). On the other hand, compromise should come before individual 
preference; a final and individual preference only as last resort. It should not, despite the 
above examples, be assumed that the preferred judgment(/s) would always (in effect) be 
anticipated / separated into blocks of two. The least preferred may have to be „penalised‟. 
More limited sequences for both draws reinforces the minimising (to the maximum) of 
anticipated outcomes. Of course, the „judge from the other Court / further judge‟ („remaining 
sealed‟) may not have been called upon to decide in the (by Chamber / Grand Chamber, under 
this procedure) previous case: hence „earlier drawn‟. 
A case requiring interpretation of the “Foundation Agreement, the Constitution, [a 
Constitutional Law,] Federal Laws (including federal administrative decisions) and Treaties 
binding upon the United Cyprus Republic”, as per Chapter 3, may be appealed against. 
Paragraph (2) provides: 
“(2) Any party to judicial proceedings involving a dispute in respect of any of the matters 
referred to in paragraph (1) of this Chapter may appeal any judgment given in such 
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proceedings at first instance, where such judgment is that of a Chamber, other than Grand 
Chamber, of the Court, or that of a court of a constituent state. 
“Provided that where the involvement of such matters only becomes apparent for the first 
time in appellate proceedings, whether in the courts of a constituent state or in a Chamber 
of the Court, other than the Grand Chamber, an appeal shall lie and shall be heard by the 
Grand Chamber”. 
Any appeal (regarding interpretation) from a Chamber under Chapter 3
68
, when heard by 
the Grand Chamber, would not be considered by the whole Court (that is, all 12 judges), but 
only the 4 (remaining) judges who did not sit in the case in the Chamber. Before 
commencement of proceedings, a „judge‟ from the other Court will be drawn (by lot, but not 
revealed) if the Chamber had relied on the (drawn / earlier drawn) judge from the other Court. 
The applicable sequence would be that of the Chamber (not the Grand Chamber); the appeal 
being annexed to the Chamber, the Grand Chamber not being seized of the case in the 
customary manner.  
The 4 judges would attempt to reach a consensus, followed by a majority decision. If this 
failed, the drawn / earlier drawn judge from the other Court would be revealed and required 
(having read and considered all relevant documents of the Chamber and the „Grand 
Chamber‟) to make the decision. 
 
VI. „SECTION MINORITY PROCEDURE‟ 
 
Each Chamber of the Court shall contain two sections. Any case shall, of course, be heard by 
all the judges of the relevant Chamber. However, under two defined procedures – „Section 
Minority‟ and „Section Majority‟ (for the latter, see below) – it may be left for the justices of 
the designated section to decide, in the event of the Chamber failing to reach a consensus or a 
majority („first majority‟). The significance of this is that each section would possess a 
majority of judges hailing from one of the constituent states. 
The „Section Minority Procedure‟, when invoked, requires the decision to be made by the 
section containing a majority of judges from the „other‟ constituent state, to the constituent 
state that is „more concerned / will be more affected‟ by the judgment. The procedure should 
apply to five chapters. 
The Court shall have jurisdiction to review
69
 decisions of the Immigration, Asylum and 
Citizenship Appeal Tribunal
70
 rendered on appeal against decisions of the Citizenship Board
71
 
                                                 
68
 Of course, reflected in the proviso to paragraph (2), the matter may be heard by the Grand Chamber 
(leapfrogging the Chamber) directly from appellate proceedings of a constituent state court. 
69
 By way of judicial review (Federal Law on Aliens and Immigration (Annex III, Attachment 5, Law 
1), Part XI, Section 152(6)). 
70
 Described, in paragraph (1) of both Chapters 7 and 8 of the Schedule to the Federal Law on 
Administration of Justice, as the “Aliens Appeal Court”. 
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or Aliens Board
72
 upon the application of an aggrieved person (Chapters 7 and 8
73
 
respectively)
74
.  
Here, the „other‟ (constituent state) should be the one other than the constituent state with 
which the „applicant‟ would acquire internal constituent state citizenship status, in the event 
that the application were successful (in respect of „first instance‟ decisions of the Citizenship 
Board) or the constituent state other than where the „applicant‟ resides / has most recently 
resided (in respect of „first instance‟ decisions of the Aliens Board). 
The Court may remove any member of the (Cyprus) Property Board (Chapter 13) upon the 
application of the federal Government or of either of the constituent states in case of 
misconduct or grave breach of the said member‟s duties75. 
Here, the „other‟ (constituent state) shall be the one other than the constituent state from 
which the member of the Property Board hails. 
The federal Parliament may refer
76
 to the Supreme Court allegations of impeachment 
(Chapter 15) regarding the members of the Presidential Council and of organs of the 
independent institutions
77
, and independent officers
78
, for grave violations of their duties or 
                                                                                                                                            
71
 Established by Section 11(1) of the Federal Law to Provide for the Citizenship of the United Cyprus 
Republic and for Matters Connected Therewith or Incidental Thereto (Annex III, Attachment 4, at Part 
V). 
72
 Established by Section 135(1) of the Federal Law on Aliens and Immigration (at Part X). 
73
 Jurisdiction lies with the Second Constitutional Chamber. However, further to paragraphs (2) of 
Chapters 7 and 8, proceedings may be referred to the Grand Constitutional Chamber. Paragraph (2) of 
Chapter 7 provides: “(2) In exceptional cases, involving serious issues of general importance, 
proceedings in terms of paragraph 1 may, upon the request of any of the Attorneys-General of the 
United Cyprus Republic or of the constituent states, be referred to the Grand Constitutional Chamber, 
and such independent officers shall be heard by the Court”. Paragraph (2) of Chapter 8 is identical 
other than in the third clause, which provides: “… the matter may…” 
74
 The “Appeal Tribunal” shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals against decisions, acts or omissions of 
the Aliens Board when implementing the Federal Laws on Aliens and Immigration (Annex III, 
Attachment 5, Law 1), on International Protection (Ibid, Law 2), on the Freedom of Movement of EU 
Citizens and the Members of their Families (Ibid, Law 3), and of any Regulations issued under these; 
and decisions, acts or omissions of the Citizenship Board when implementing the “Federal Law on 
United Cyprus Republic Citizenship” (Annex III, Attachment 4). The “Appeal Tribunal” shall also 
have jurisdiction to hear actions brought before it for human rights violations by the Aliens Board, the 
Citizenship Board or immigration officers when implementing the three federal laws comprising 
Attachment 5 (of Annex III). Federal Law on Aliens and Immigration, Part XI, Section 152(1). 
75
 See also: Annex VII, Attachment 2, Article 2(10) (second sentence). The final sentence of Chapter 
13 states: “… The decision of the Court is not subject to appeal, if taken by more than three judges”. 
Cases under Chapter 13 would (normally) be heard by the Second Constitutional Chamber (having 
only three judges). The composition of the Chambers of the Supreme Court are, however, only 
„indicative‟. 
76
 Following a preliminary investigation by a Special Committee, and approval of the Committee‟s 
report by special majority of the Senate (Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 
15, paragraph (2)). See also:  Federal Law on Impeachment, Annex III, Attachment 28, Section 5. 
77
 Article 32(4) of the UCR Constitution (at Part V) begins: “(4) The organs of the Central Bank shall 
be the Governor and the Deputy-Governor, the Board of Directors and the Monetary Policy 
Committee…” The members of the Board of Directors and Monetary Policy Committee (besides the 
Governor and Deputy Governor: see, Article 32(4)(b) and (c)) shall „also‟ be liable to impeachment. 
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serious crimes
79
. Upon such allegations being made, the Court shall have jurisdiction to lift 
the immunity of any such (high) federal officials of the United Cyprus Republic
80
. 
Here, the „other‟ (constituent state) shall be the one other than the constituent state from 
which the person subject to the “allegations of impeachment” hails. 
Any individual or political party who has a legitimate interest to challenge an alleged 
violation of the Federal Law on the Election of Members of Parliament (Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies)
81
 may file a complaint with the Electoral Precinct Commission or the 
Federal Election Commission
82
. The Electoral Precinct Commission
83
 shall have first instance 
competence in all matters related to the decisions and workings of the polling station and the 
presiding officer
84
. Decisions of the Electoral Precinct Commission may be appealed to the 
Federal Election Commission
85
. The Federal Election Commission shall have first instance 
competence in all matters related to the election of candidates and any other matter which is 
“not of the express competence of the Electoral Precinct Commissions”86. The Supreme Court 
shall sit as an Electoral Court (Chapter 16). All decisions of the Federal Election Commission 
may be appealed to the Electoral Court, no later than fifteen days from the communication of 
the Federal Election Commission decision to the person concerned or his advocate
87
. 
The Electoral Court shall have jurisdiction, inter alia, to entertain petitions regarding the 
improper conduct of elections by officials, the legal qualifications of the successful 
candidates, the commission of electoral offences or the deeming of votes to be void
88
. The 
election as a whole, or the election of any candidate, may be declared to be void. Equally, the 
petitioner may be entitled to a declaration that a candidate was duly elected and ought to have 
been returned or for a recounting of the votes
89
. 
The Supreme Court shall, also, sit as an Electoral Court in respect of local elections
90
 and 
elections to the European Parliament
91
. 
                                                                                                                                            
78
 That is, besides (the members of/) the organs of the Central Bank, the Attorney-General and the 
Deputy Attorney-General and the Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditor-General (Annex I, Part V, 
Article 33(1)).  
79
 Annex I, Part V, Article 24(4). 
80
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 15, paragraph (1). See also: Federal 
Law on Federal Government Immunities and Exemptions, Annex III, Attachment 21, Section 4. 
81
 Annex III, Attachment 20, Law 2. 
82
 Ibid, Part IX, Section 69(1). 
83
 There are two Electoral Precinct Commissions (/ precincts), one for each constituent state. 
84
 Ibid, Section 70(1). 
85
 Ibid, Section 71(1). 
86
 Ibid, Section 71(2). 
87
 Ibid, Section 72(1). 
88
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 16, paragraph (1). 
89
 Federal Law on the Election of Members of Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) (Annex 
III, Attachment 20, Law 2), Part IX, Section 72(2). 
90
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 16, paragraph (2). 
91
 Ibid, paragraph (4). 
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„Here‟, the „other‟ (constituent state) shall be the one other than the constituent state where 
the (challenged) conduct has occurred. 
For the aggrieved applicant, member / person accused or conduct concerned, the decision 
may, finally, rest with that „other‟ (personified by the relevant section). Such will guarantee 
that a decision can be reached and will give (but no more than that) the judges hailing from 
the constituent state „less concerned / (will be) less affected‟ (by the judgment) the 
opportunity to make the decisive impact
92
. 
 
VII. „SECTION MAJORITY PROCEDURE‟ 
 
The section(/s) facility may, also, be employed under a further Chapter, and part of one other. 
However, under this procedure, the members of the section(/s) that may come to rule on the 
case shall be the one(/s) where judges hailing from the applicant constituent state are in the 
majority. 
A constituent state may apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction (Chapter 6) barring a 
person who does not hold its internal constituent state citizenship status from entering or 
residing in that constituent state. The Court shall grant the injunction if the relevant person 
has been, or is, actively engaged in acts of violence or incitement to violence and the presence 
of the person in the constituent state would be a danger to public safety or public order
93
. 
The Court may issue an injunction restricting civilian traffic (remaining part of Chapter 
11, see above) “on direct connecting roads between the main part of a constituent state and a 
non-contiguous part, as well as on direct connecting roads through a non-contiguous part of a 
constituent state”94. An application for such an injunction may be made by the Attorney-
General of a constituent state where the relevant road lies (hence: “between”), or by both 
Attorneys-General, if the road lies in both constituent states (“between… as well as”). 
In the event of neither consensus nor majority being reached, a „second majority‟ may 
(again) determine the outcome. Naturally, this would place the applicant constituent state, 
from the outset, in a potential advantage. However, this ought not to occasion concern in light 
of the narrow and (no doubt) pressing circumstances.  
It should be noted that (Chapter 11) where an application is made by “both Attorneys-
General”, both sections should preside, with any decision (requiring a „second majority‟), for 
each Attorney-General, being made separately by the section with the „majority‟ for that 
Attorney-General. 
 
                                                 
92
 Although it should not be assumed that these judges would hold (always) either a uniform or „the 
expected‟ position. 
93
 See also: Constitutional Law on Internal Constituent State Citizenship Status and Constituent State 
Residency Rights (Annex II, Attachment 3), Section 6. 
94
 See also: Annex VI, Article 2(1). 
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VIII. „GROUP PROCEDURE‟ 
 
As already demonstrated by those Chapters „subject‟ to the „Section Minority‟ and „Section 
Majority Procedure[s]‟, some decisions require a „simple‟, limited and defined (be it positive 
or negative
95
) conclusion. However, on occasions there may be no constituent state that is 
„more concerned / (will be) more affected‟ and, therefore, no justification (respectively) for 
externalisation / internalisation. This condition touches two Chapters of the Schedule, and 
part of one other. 
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine (Chapter 2), at the 
request of any authority of the federal Government or any authority of the constituent states, 
the validity of any federal or constituent state law under the UCR Constitution and/or to 
determine any question that may arise from the precedence of Constitutional Laws
96
. Upon 
request of constituent state courts or other federal or constituent state authorities it may do so 
in the form of a binding opinion
97
. A party to judicial proceedings, further, before any court, 
whether of the United Cyprus Republic or of a constituent state, and whether at first instance 
or on appeal, may, at any stage of such proceedings, raise – “(a) any question relating to the 
validity of any Federal Law or of any constituent state law; (b) any question that may arise 
from the precedence of Constitutional Laws, including constituent state agreements in terms 
of Section 2 of Article 16 of the Constitution
98
; and (c) any question relating to compatibility 
of a Law, act or measure by the Federal Government or a constituent state government, with a 
law, act or measure of the European Union applicable to the United Cyprus Republic, which 
law, act or measure is material for the determination of any matter at issue in such 
proceedings”99. Where relevant, the Court100 shall transmit its decision to any court by which 
                                                 
95
 Whether “in whole or in part”, also, in the context of judicial review. Note its effects in Chapter 4 
(below). 
96
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(3) (first sentence); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, 
Chapter 2, paragraphs (1) and (2). 
97
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(3) (second sentence); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, 
Schedule, Chapter 2, paragraph (3). 
98
 Article 16(2) of the UCR Constitution (at Part IV) provides: “(2) The constituent states may conclude 
agreements with each other or with the federal government. Such agreements may create common 
organisations and institutions on matters within the competence of the parties. Such agreements shall 
have the same legal standing as Constitutional Laws, provided they have been approved by the federal 
Parliament and both constituent state legislatures”. The reference to Article 16(2) in paragraph (4)(b) of 
Chapter 2 is necessitated by the matter of “precedence”. Cooperation Agreements concluded between 
the constituent states alone would only have the “… same legal standing as Constitutional Laws, 
provided they have been approved by the federal Parliament and both constituent state legislatures”. 
99
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 2, paragraph (4). 
100
 Paragraphs (7) and (8) of Chapter 2 provide: “(7) Where the matter or question involves a serious 
issue of general importance, it shall be heard by Grand [sic.] Constitutional Chamber. (8) In cases other 
than those referred to in paragraph (7), subject to the Court‟s power to organise its work, such matters 
or questions shall be determined by the First Constitutional Chamber”. 
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such matters and questions have been reserved and any decision of the Court shall be binding 
on such court and on any of the parties to the proceedings
101
. 
Any person aggrieved by any decision or act declared by the Court to be null and void
102
, 
or aggrieved by any omission declared by the judgment of the Court as being an omission, 
shall be entitled, if his claim is not met to his satisfaction by the organ, authority or person 
concerned, to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of damages, or for the grant of 
another remedy, and shall recover just and equitable damages to be assessed by the Court, or 
shall be granted such other just and equitable remedy as the Court is empowered to grant
103
. 
The Court shall be the appeals court (Chapter 3, part) in all disputes on matters which 
involve any alleged violation of the Foundation Agreement, the Constitution of the United 
Cyprus Republic, federal laws (including federal administrative decisions) and treaties 
binding upon the United Cyprus Republic, including the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Additional Protocols in force for Cyprus
104
.  
During the first two years after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement (Chapter 
17)
105
, a constituent state may object to a particular treaty having been listed in Annex V of 
the Foundation Agreement
106
, or any reservation or declaration related to such treaty, on 
grounds of incompatibility with the Foundation Agreement
107
. Such objection shall be 
addressed to the Council of Ministers
108
 or the Presidential Council
109
. Upon receipt of such 
                                                 
101
 Ibid, paragraph (6) (second sentence). 
102
 Article 2(3) of the Main Articles of the Foundation Agreement states: “(3) The federal government 
and the constituent states shall fully respect and not infringe upon the powers and functions of each 
other. There shall be no hierarchy between federal and constituent state laws. Any act in contravention 
of the Constitution shall be null and void”. 
103
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 2, paragraph (9). 
104
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(4) (including Note (22)); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, 
Schedule, Chapter 3, paragraph (1). Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Chapter 3 provide: “(2) Any party to 
judicial proceedings involving a dispute in respect of any of the matters referred to in paragraph (1) of 
this Chapter may appeal any judgment given in such proceedings at first instance, where such judgment 
is that of a Chamber, other than Grand Chamber, of the Court, or that of a court of a constituent state. 
[new paragraph] Provided that, where the involvement of such matters only becomes apparent for the 
first time in appellate proceedings, whether in the courts of a constituent state or in a Chamber of the 
Court, other than the Grand Chamber, an appeal shall lie and shall be heard by the Grand Chamber. (3) 
The Federal Attorney-General and the Attorneys-General of either of the constituent states may 
intervene as amicus curiae in any appeal under paragraph (2)”. 
105
 Subject to the duty of the Court to decide on objections with which it has been seized before the 
expiry of the two-year period (Chapter 17, paragraph (2)). 
106
 Annex V: “List of International Treaties and Instruments Binding on the United Cyprus Republic”. 
107
 The term “Foundation Agreement” includes obligations arising out of membership of the European 
Union (Observation to Article 48(1) of the UCR Constitution). 
108
 Further to Article 41(1) and (2) of the UCR Constitution (at Part VII): “(1) Until such time as the 
newly elected federal Parliament shall have elected a Presidential Council, the Council of Ministers 
shall act as the Government of the United Cyprus Republic. (2) Upon entry into force of the 
Foundation Agreement, the members of the Council of Ministers shall be those persons whose names 
were communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than two days after 
successful referenda”. 
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objection, the Council of Ministers or the Presidential Council shall within two weeks decide 
on the compatibility of the treaty with the Foundation Agreement. If they cannot reach a 
decision within that time, they shall immediately refer the matter to the Supreme Court which 
shall decide without delay
110
. 
Matters bearing upon validity, precedence, violation and compatibility may not yield 
multiple outcomes („also‟), but neither the one („constituent state‟) nor the other should be 
given an „opportunity‟ to determine. In such an event, if the relevant Chamber is unable to 
reach a consensus, the justices should divide into their pairs (/ groups) with the aim of 
arriving at a consensus position within their respective group. Only groups that have reached 
consensus shall have their position considered: the majority position providing the outcome. 
In the event of a tie between either position, the most senior group to have reached consensus 
shall decide. Only in those instances where no group (of the Chamber) has managed to reach 
consensus shall the outcome be determined by the judge drawn by lot („at the commencement 
of proceedings‟) from the „partner‟ Chamber or (for the Grand Chambers) the other Court. 
The judge drawn by lot shall not be revealed until the moment arrives (in the given case) 
where the position of that judge is required in order for an outcome to be secured. Once again, 
that judge may be an earlier drawn judge if the previous case heard under this procedure (by / 
type of Chamber) had not required the „intervention‟ of the „partner / other‟ judge. As with 
the „Compromise Procedure‟, drawing by lot should be governed by sequences (here, again, 
separate from any other sequence), a draw being conducted either four times or ten times (for 
the Grand Chambers) for each sequence. 
„Similar‟ (to the final possible stage of the „Compromise Procedure‟), the (drawn) judge 
would be provided with a copy of the transcript of the proceedings; and, having read and 
considered all relevant documents, required to issue a decision.  
This would be the only procedure of the Court where a failure to reach consensus would 
not be followed by an attempt to establish a majority (opinion). Any individualised position 
(by opinion) would only prejudice the possibility of arriving at consensus within a group or 
render any arrived at consensus (within a group) liable to the accusation that it was the 
product of some kind of pressure. 
Seniority should decide in the event of a tie. Employment of the „partner / other‟ judge, in 
the context of this procedure, ought again, as with the „Compromise Procedure‟ and the judge 
from the other Court / further judge, be highly residual. „Likewise‟, no sequence should risk 
„concluding‟ with a „predetermined‟ outcome. 
                                                                                                                                            
109
 Annex I, Part VII, Article 48(1). Paragraph (1) of Chapter 17 incorrectly refers to “… the Co-
Presidents or the Council of Ministers…” It should read: „… the Presidential Council or the Council of 
Ministers…‟ 
110
 Annex I, Part VII, Article 48(2); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 17, 
paragraph (1). 
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IX. „50:50 PROCEDURE‟ 
 
A „split decision‟ may, on occasions, provide a determination. This can be reflected in three 
of the current Chapters, and in part of one other. 
Ten years after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the Property Board shall be 
wound up
111
. The Court may (Chapter 14), upon application by the Property Board, or by the 
executive heads of the constituent states acting by consensus, extend the period of operation 
of a specific section of the Property Board for one year at a time in order to enable completion 
of a specific function and may order the retention by that section or sections of specified 
assets to enable the continuation of work. Notwithstanding any such limited extension of 
operation of a particular section or sections, the Property Board shall be considered to be 
wound up unless the Court orders otherwise
112
. 
A Property Court shall be established (Chapter 12) with power to conduct final judicial 
review (only) of decisions of the Claims Panel (of the Property Board)
113
. The Property Court 
shall continue in operation until such time as the Supreme Court may decide to assume its 
functions
114
. 
Where a question is raised before the Court, it may, if it considers that a decision on such 
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice (of the 
European Union) to give a preliminary ruling thereon (Chapter 21)
115
. Where any such 
                                                 
111
 “(2) The Governing Council may decide, by majority of five to two and subject to the approval of 
the heads of government of the constituent states acting by consensus, to wind itself up on a date earlier 
than ten years after commencement of its operations, provided that its work has been completed or 
appropriate provision has been made for transfer to a competent body of any outstanding functions or 
matters” (Annex VII, Attachment 2, Article 8(2)). 
112
 Annex VII, Attachment 2, Article 8(3); and, Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, 
Chapter 14, paragraph (1). Concerning the winding-up of the Property Board, Article 8(5) of 
Attachment 2 of Annex VII: “(5) Prior to its winding-up, the Property Board shall make arrangements 
for the completion of any tasks or functions assigned to it under these provisions, including any claims 
or disputes which are pending or which may arise in future. For this purpose, it may refer or request the 
Supreme Court to assign specified claims or cases to other competent bodies or courts or to a section of 
the Property Board, which will continue in operation by order of the Supreme Court. The obligation to 
ensure or make arrangements for completion of any tasks or functions under these provisions shall also 
apply to any section of the Property Board which continues in operation for any extended period”. See 
also: Administration of Justice Law, Schedule, Chapter 14, paragraph (2). 
113
 Annex VII, Part IV, Article 22(1). Further to Article 22(3) and (4) (judicial review only): “(3) 
Decisions of the Claims Panel shall not be subject to appeal or challenge in any constituent state court 
or otherwise, except by way of judicial review by the Property Court in accordance with the law and 
these provisions. (4) Decisions of the Property Court shall not be subject to further review or appeal to 
the Supreme Court”. Regarding Article 22(4), see also: Federal Law on Administration of Justice, 
Schedule, Chapter 12, paragraph (3). 
114
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 12, paragraph (4). 
115
 Article 234 of the Treaty (minus the final paragraph, see below) states: “The Court of Justice shall 
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB [European 
Central Bank]; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, 
where those statutes so provide. [new paragraph] Where such a question is raised before any court or 
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question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice
116
. 
Upon a recourse under Chapter 1
117
 (of the Schedule to the federal law), the Court may 
order that the operation of the law, or decision, or act, as the case may be, which is the subject 
matter of the recourse shall be suspended until the determination of the recourse
118
. 
The „winding-up‟ (to section/s) or “otherwise” of the Property Board; the assumption of 
the functions of the Property Court; request of a preliminary ruling / referral (including by the 
Supreme Court) to the European Court of Justice; and, order for suspension of the law, 
decision or act need not be subject to the securing of a majority (at the very least) amongst the 
judges presiding in the given case. In any of these instances, a „split decision‟ (that is, 50:50) 
should be regarded as a positive decision on the matter: for example, to “extend the period of 
operation of a specific section of the Property Board for one year”. 
 
X. „LAW / AGREEMENT SPECIFIED PROCEDURE‟ 
 
For three Chapters, the relevant Constitutional Law / Cooperation Agreement / federal law 
shall specify, for any instance, the procedure to be applied in the Court. 
First, the Court shall have the power (Chapter 10), in terms of Article 12 of the 
Cooperation Agreement on European Union Relations, to decide any dispute resulting from 
the application of such Agreement
119
. For instance, proceedings brought under Article 5(6) of 
the Agreement would be governed by the „Compromise Procedure‟120. Second, (Chapter 19) 
admiralty jurisdiction
121
. For instance, proceedings brought under Section 3(3)(b) of the 
Federal Law on Admiralty Jurisdiction would be considered by the Court in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                            
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. [new 
paragraph] Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice”. For text of the Treaty, see: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html  
116
 The final paragraph of Article 234 quoted verbatim. Paragraph (2) of Chapter 21 reflects this final 
paragraph by stating: “(2) Where any such question is raised before the Court and there is no judicial 
remedy under national law, the Court shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice”. 
117
 Chapter 1 is titled: “Disputes between the constituent states or between one or both constituent 
states and the Federal Government (Article 36.2)”. 
118
 “… [A]nd any such order shall be forthwith published in the Gazette” (Chapter 1, paragraph (5)). 
119
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 10, paragraph (1). Article 12 of the 
Cooperation Agreement (Annex IV, Attachment 2) provides: “Any dispute resulting from the 
application of this Agreement shall be decided by the Supreme Court of Cyprus”. 
120
 That is, the failure of the Coordination Group (established under Article 5(1) of the Agreement) to 
reach a decision and the referral of the matter (to the Court) by any of its members. Note: paragraph (2) 
of Chapter 10 (of the Schedule) incorrectly describes Article 5(6) as „Article 5(5)‟ (“… paragraphs 5 
and 13 of Article 5…”). 
121
 See also: Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 4, paragraph (2)(d). 
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the „Group Procedure‟122. Third, (Chapter 20) in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
any Constitutional Law or Cooperation Agreement. For instance, the Court would be required 
to rule on disputes under Section 5(2) of the Constitutional Law on the Strength and 
Equipment of the Constituent State Police Forces in accordance (also) with the „Group 
Procedure‟123. On the other hand, it may not always be possible / practicable to have 
determined „in advance‟ (for every conceivable recourse, under the Agreement / Law) the 
procedure to be employed. Returning, as an example, to Article 12 of the Cooperation 
Agreement on European Union Relations, „a dispute‟ may not have its procedure specified124. 
In such an event, the procedure should be determined, in advance of any proceedings, by the 
Presidency of the Court by majority. Quorum should be two members (of the Presidency). 
Where any member is absent (from the relevant meeting), the decision should be made by 
unanimity. Failing these: by the President / Acting President. 
 
XI. „CHAPTER 4: VARYING PROCEDURES‟ 
 
The Court shall have primary jurisdiction over violations of federal law
125
 where provided by 
federal legislation (Chapter 4)
126
. The relevant sub-paragraphs / paragraphs of the Chapter 
shall specify the procedure to be followed. 
Primary jurisdiction shall include: 
(a) First instance judicial review of decisions, acts or omissions of any federal organ, 
authority or person exercising any administrative authority contrary to any of the provisions 
                                                 
122
 Section 3(3)(b) of the Federal Law (Annex III, Attachment 11, Law 20) provides that the Court has 
jurisdiction to hear any proceedings concerning: “(3)(b) any action to enforce a claim for damages loss 
of life or personal injury arising out of – (i) a collision between ships; or (ii) the carrying out of or 
omission to carry out a manoeuvre in the case of one or more ships; or (iii) non-compliance, on the part 
of one or more of two or more ships, with any collision regulations in force for the time being”.  
123
 Section 5(2) of the Constitutional Law (Annex II, Attachment 2, Law 1) states: “(2) No weapons 
shall be purchased by any constituent state for the needs of its police force unless the following 
procedure is followed: (a) Before purchasing any such weapons, the government of the constituent state 
concerned shall notify the Presidential Council and the government of the other constituent state of the 
type and number of weapons to be purchased. (b) The Purchase of the weapons shall be considered as 
having been authorised if no objections are raised, in writing, by the Presidential Council or by the 
government of the other constituent state within one month from the notification referred to in 
paragraph (a) above. (c) If objections are raised as provided in paragraph (b), the member of the 
Presidential Council and the members of the governments of the constituent states, having 
responsibility in respect of police matters, shall hold consultations and may, within two months from 
the date on which the objections were raised, resolve the matter by consensus. If consensus is not 
achieved within the said time limit, the Presidential Council or the government of a constituent state 
may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Cyprus, which shall decide whether the envisaged 
purchase of weapons complies with the provisions of the Constitution and of this Law”. Section 5(1) 
provides: “(1) Constituent state police forces may only carry weapons appropriate for normal civilian 
police duties”. The keyword in Section 5(2) is “complies”. 
124
 Article 12 begins: “Any dispute resulting from the application of this Agreement…” It does not, for 
example, refer (inter alia) to Article 5(6). 
125
 Including Regulations and Orders under federal laws. 
126
 Annex I, Part V, Article 36(5); Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 4, 
paragraph (1). 
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of the (UCR) Constitution, any Constitutional Law or federal law, or made in excess or abuse 
of the power vested
127
. Recourse to the Court may be made by a person whose existing 
legitimate interest is adversely and directly affected by such decision or act or omission
128
. 
Upon such a recourse the Court may, by its decision – (i) confirm, either in whole or in part, 
such decision or act or omission; or (ii) declare, either in whole or in part, such decision or act 
to be null and void and of no effect whatsoever; or (iii) declare that such omission, either in 
whole or in part, ought not to have been made and that whatever has been omitted should 
have been performed
129
. 
This should be governed by the „Group Procedure‟. 
(b) Civil actions, other than actions under paragraph (9) of Chapter 2 (see above), in 
respect of violations of a federal law for which damages, injunction, declaratory judgment or 
any other relief is ordinarily granted by a court exercising jurisdiction, provided that such 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by the federal law in question
130
. 
This should be governed by the „Law / Agreement Specified Procedure‟. 
(c) Criminal jurisdiction over offences against federal laws reserved for the Court by 
federal jurisdiction
131
.  
This should be governed by the „Group Procedure‟. 
                                                 
127
 Federal Law on Administration of Justice, Schedule, Chapter 4, paragraphs (2)(a) and (8) (opening 
paragraph). 
128
 Ibid, paragraph (8)(a). In this regard, further to Section 31(2) of the federal law (at Part V): “(2) 
When a recourse, made in terms of Section 5 of Article 36 of the Constitution (primary jurisdiction) 
and paragraph (8) of Chapter 4 of Schedule [sic.], appears to be prima facie frivolous, the Court or a 
Chamber may, after hearing arguments by or on behalf of the parties concerned, unanimously dismiss 
such recourse without a public hearing, if satisfied that the recourse is in fact frivolous”. 
129
 Ibid, paragraph (8)(c). Paragraph (8) concludes (at sub-paragraph (d)) with: “(d) Any decision given 
under sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall be binding on all courts, organs and authorities of the 
United Cyprus Republic and shall be given effect to and acted upon by the organ, authority or person 
concerned”. 
130
 Ibid, paragraph (2)(b). Note: paragraph 2(b) excepts “actions under section 11 of Chapter 2”. This is 
incorrect, Chapter 2 concludes at paragraph [/ section] (9). Thus, it should read: „… actions under 
paragraph [/ section] 9 of Chapter 2…‟ Concerning a federal law conferring such jurisdiction upon the 
Court: judgment, for example, may be awarded against an employer for an accident or occupational 
disease falling upon an employee; the adjudged sum being payable by the insurer to the person/s in 
whose favour the judgment has been given (Federal Law on Compulsory Insurance of Employers 
against their Liability in the Case of Accidents towards Employees (Annex III, Attachment 32, Law 3), 
Sections 2 (definition of “judgment”) and 9(1)). 
131
 Ibid, paragraph 2(c). Article 15(2) of the UCR Constitution provides (at Part IV): “(2) The 
constituent states shall have primary criminal jurisdiction over offences against federal laws, unless 
such jurisdiction is reserved for the Supreme Court of Cyprus by federal legislation”. Concerning a 
federal law conferring such jurisdiction upon the Court: criminal responsibility, for example, arising 
from Section 21 of the Federal Law on Insider Dealing, Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) and 
Related Issues (Annex III, Attachment 31, Law 1), at Part V. Every criminal case before the Supreme 
Court (first instance and appeal) shall be heard before the relevant / appropriate Chamber / judges, and 
not by a single judge (see: Sections 89, 91 (at Part III) and 111 (at Part V), Federal Law on Criminal 
Procedure (Annex III, Attachment 26, Law 3)). Only (the) necessary pre-trial matters may be 
considered by a single judge of a Chamber.  
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(d) Further: (i) the Court may try any offence in accordance with arrangements made, 
under paragraph (13) of Appendix O to the Treaty of Establishment
132
 regarding offences 
committed in whole or in part within the Sovereign Base Areas where both the complainant 
and the accused person are citizens of the United Cyprus Republic
133
; and, (ii) offences in 
respect of which the laws of the United Cyprus Republic are applicable under a Treaty or 
Convention binding on the United Cyprus Republic, and creates an offence triable by Courts 
of the United Cyprus Republic
134
. 
Again, these should be governed by the „Group Procedure‟. 
Any court direction, civil law remedy or order
135
 (being the consequence, rather than the 
basis for the action), or criminal law punishment or order, should be determined, under the 
„Group Procedure‟ – (and possibly, therefore, if necessary) by the most senior group 
responsible for determining the outcome of the case or (where no group reaches consensus) 
by the „partner / other‟ judge.  
Any civil law remedy or order (being the basis for the action), and reflecting „the other 
part‟ of Chapter 22, shall also be governed by the „Group Procedure‟. Under Chapter 22: 
“The Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, may issue orders of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto against federal organs authorities of 
officials [sic.]”. 
 
XII. APPEALS 
 
                                                 
132
 With the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
133
 Chapter 4, paragraph (4). Paragraph (13) of Appendix O provides: “Arrangements will also be made 
to enable certain criminal proceedings in which both the complainant and accused are Cypriots to be 
tried by the Courts of the Republic”. For text of Appendix O: 
http://www.sba.mod.uk/web_pages/appdx-o.htm  
134
 Chapter 4, paragraph (5). For example, (Part II of) the Federal Law on Drug Trafficking (Annex III, 
Attachment 27, Law 2), Section 44(2)(a), in respect of Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention 
against the Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
135
 The Court may issue interim orders and any other order which is ancillary to any proceedings within 
its jurisdiction (Section 21, Federal Law on Administration of Justice, at Part III). Rule 14 of Annex II 
(titled: “General Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court”) provides: “(1) The Court, may, at any stage 
of the proceedings, either ex proprio motu or on the application of any party, make a provisional order, 
not disposing of the case on its merits, if the justice of the case so requires. (2) A provisional order 
made under this rule may, either on the ground of urgency or of other special circumstances, be made 
without notice and upon such terms as may be deemed appropriate in the circumstances: [new 
paragraph] Provided that all parties affected by an order made under this rule shall be served forthwith 
with notice thereof so as to enable them to object to it and upon such an objection the Court, after 
hearing arguments by or on behalf of the parties concerned, may either discharge, vary or confirm such 
order under such terms as it may deem fit”. Rule 8(2) of Annex III (titled: “The Default Provision and 
Deadlock-Resolution Procedural Rules), concerning Chapter 5, provides: “(2) If it appears to the Court 
that there is in any cause or matter a question of law which it would be convenient to have decided 
before any evidence is given or any question or issue of fact is tried, the Court may make an order 
accordingly and may direct such question of law to be raised for the opinion of the Court either by 
special case stated or in such other manner as the Court may deem expedient, and all such further 
proceedings as the decision of such question of law may render unnecessary may thereupon be stayed”. 
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Any appeal from a Chamber to Grand Chamber under Chapters 3 (“violation of…”, „Group 
Procedure‟), 4136, 13 and 19, as well as on an order for a preliminary ruling of the European 
Court of Justice (under Chapter 21(1))
137
 and on interlocutory matters
138
 shall be heard (by the 
relevant „Grand Chamber‟) only by the 6 judges of the Court (from the other Chamber) not to 
have sat in the case at first instance. Any such appeal must be considered with an original eye. 
 
XIII. REGISTRY 
 
The Registrar need not be a non-Cypriot. The Registry
139
 should be composed of (four 
persons) a Registrar, First Deputy Registrar and two Deputy Registrars (two hailing from 
each constituent state). The Registrar and First Deputy Registrar should not hail from the 
same constituent state. Besides their normal duties
140
, each Registrar should be assigned to at 
                                                 
136
 Annex I of the Federal Law on Administration of Justice, under Grand Chamber of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction, incorrectly states: “This Chamber has jurisdiction to hear appeals from any decision of a 
Chamber exercising primary criminal jurisdiction”. Chapter 4 (over which all three primary chambers 
of the Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction have competence) is titled: “Primary jurisdiction over 
violations of Federal Laws where provided by Federal legislation”. This primary jurisdiction, however, 
includes “first instance judicial review” (Chapter 4, paragraph 1(2)(a)) and “[c]ivil actions… conferred 
upon the Court by the Federal Law in question” (Ibid, paragraph 1(2)(b)). These are „reflected‟ in 
Section 22 of the federal law and Article 36(5) of the UCR Constitution. Section 22  (at Part III) states: 
“An appeal shall lie from any decision of the Court exercising its primary jurisdiction under Section 5 
of Article 36 of the Constitution in accordance with the provisions of any relevant Law, to a Chamber 
designated by the Court as being appropriate to hear such appeal”. Article 36(5) (at Part V) states: “(5) 
The Supreme Court shall have primary jurisdiction over violations of federal law where provided by 
federal legislation”. Thus, for “first instance judicial review” and “[c]ivil actions”, the right to appeal in 
respect of these should be reflected, also, in Annex I, which, under Grand Chamber of Primary Federal 
Jurisdiction, should be amended to read: “[Chapter] 4. Appeals from a Chamber having exercised 
primary jurisdiction over violations of Federal Laws where provided by Federal legislation”.  
137
 Rules 5 and 6 of Annex IV (titled: “The References to the European Court of Justice Rules”) 
provide: “5. When an order has been made, the Registrar shall send a copy thereof to the Registrar of 
the European Court; but in the case of an order made by the Constitutional or Primary Chambers, he 
shall not do so, unless the Court otherwise orders, until the time for appealing against the order has 
expired or, if an appeal is entered within that time, until the appeal has been determined or otherwise 
disposed of. 6. An order made by a Constitutional or Primary Chamber shall be deemed to be a final 
decision, and accordingly an appeal against it shall lie to the relevant Grand Chamber without leave; 
but the period within which a notice of appeal must be served shall be 14 days”. 
138
 This should be noted, in Annex I, under both the Grand Constitutional Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction, rather than just (as currently) under the latter. 
139
 Section 24(1) of the federal law (at Part IV) provides: “(1) The Court shall have its own Registry 
and shall, if it divides itself into Chambers in terms of Section 7 of Article 36 of the Constitution, have 
registries for each Chamber”. 
140
 These are, „respectively‟, listed in Section 25 (titled: “Duties of the Registrar and the Deputy 
Registrars”): “(1) Subject to any Rules of Court or to any orders made thereunder by the Court, the 
Registrar shall issue all summonses, warrants, precepts and writs of execution, shall register all orders 
and judgments, shall keep records of all proceedings of the Court, shall have the custody and keep an 
account of all fees and fines payable or paid into Court and of all moneys paid into or out of Court, 
shall enter an account of all such fees, fines and moneys as and when received, in a book belonging to 
the Court, to be kept by the Registrar for that purpose, shall from time to time, at such times as shall be 
required by the Regulations of the Accountant-General, or as may be directed by the Court, submit 
accounts to be audited and settled by the Auditor-General and shall, subject to any such Regulations or 
directions, pay into the office of the Accountant-General the amount of fines and fees in his custody. 
(2) Subject to any Rules of Court or order made thereunder by the Court, the Registrar, and any Deputy 
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least one chamber of the Court
141
: the Registrar, the Grand Constitutional Chamber; the First 
Deputy Registrar, the Grand Chamber of Primary Federal Jurisdiction; one of the Deputy 
Registrars, the first and second constitutional chamber; the other, the first and second primary 
chamber. The Deputy Registrar assigned to the first and second constitutional chamber should 
not hail from the same constituent state as the Registrar. Like the judges of the Court, the 
Registrars should serve for seven year renewable terms, although the same person should not 
serve more than two successive terms (during any single period
142
) as Registrar. In the event 
of the temporary absence or incapacity of any Registrar, the other Registrar hailing from the 
same constituent state shall „deputise‟ as Acting Registrar143. There should be no „transitional 
Registry‟144. 
 
XIV. FINAL WORD 
 
Any legal draftsman should be obliged to consider the worst-case-scenario. Undoubtedly, 
removing the foreign judges from the Court risks deadlock, but this article has proved that 
with the employment (into the system) of a little patience and ingenuity the Court could still 
remain highly functional. Hopefully, the members of the Court would commonly refrain from 
being partisan, therefore making such type of provisions sit oddly, but this may not always be 
the case. At such times, mechanisms are required to avert crisis. This is where the means of 
making an even number into an odd becomes so useful. It has been proved that it can be done 
and, most crucial of all, at no one‟s expense. 
                                                                                                                                            
Registrar, shall be Taxing Master for the Chamber to which he belongs, and shall tax all bills of costs 
in accordance with the scale of fees for the time being in force, subject to review of such taxation by 
the Court, [new paragraph] Provided that the Court may direct that taxation of costs in any case shall in 
the first instance take place before the Court itself. (3) The Registrar, or a Deputy Registrar, as the case 
may be, shall have the duty by himself or by his officers to receive writs and processes of the Court, 
and to execute the same and to make returns thereto: [new paragraph] Provided that the Registrar shall 
not be liable to be sued for any act or omission of any messenger, bailiff, or other person in the 
execution of any process which shall have been done or may have occurred either through disobedience 
or neglect of orders or instructions given by him, or which may have been done or occurred without his 
authority”. 
141
 Section 24(5) provides: “(5) If the Court is divided into Chambers, the Registrar and each of the 
Deputy Registrars shall each be assigned one of the Chambers. They shall hold the above offices 
alternately for such period as the Court may decide”. “[T]he above offices” here can only mean their 
attachment to any relevant Chamber/s. 
142
 Thus, any person may serve more than two terms as Registrar. 
143
 With the Grand Constitutional Chamber being assigned to the Registrar and with Chapter 5 cases 
being heard only before this Chamber, the definition for “Registrar” in Rule 2(2) of Annex III (of the 
federal law) and Rule 5(2) (from the same Annex) should be deleted. The definition states: 
““Registrar” means the Registrar of the Court and includes Deputy Registrars”. Rule 5(2) provides: 
“(2) Any jurisdiction conferred by these Rules on the Registrar shall be exercisable by him or by a 
Deputy Registrar”. 
144
 Article 45(3) of the UCR Constitution (at Part VII) states: “(3) The Registrar, who shall be a non-
Cypriot, and two Deputy Registrars of the Supreme Court shall assume their functions immediately 
upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. They will remain in office for 36 calendar months, 
when they shall be replaced in accordance with the law”. 
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